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Abstract:  
Energy prices are often distorted by government control, which is usually 
justified on the grounds that such control will help mitigate the negative 
impact of price volatility from oil imports, and thus positively affect the 
domestic economy. In this paper, we show in a two-sector growth model, that 
regulatory price distortion can negatively affect the economy, and then, based 
on the model, we empirically estimate the impact of the price distortion on 
output growth in China, using monthly, time series data from 2005M1 to 
2012M12. In contrast to the usual argument for regulatory control to mitigate 
price volatility, we find that regulatory price distortion negatively affects 
output growth in China during both the short and long term, because it is 
robust to different measures of output and price distortion. Hence, the 
argument that using price regulation to protect economic growth is 
undermined, and subsequently, this study lends its support to energy price 
deregulation. A market oriented, energy price regime may improve the 
resilience of the domestic economy to global, oil price shocks.  
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Policy makers generally believe that oil price shocks exert negative 
impacts on the domestic economy, and, due to this belief, price regulation in 
the energy market, such as price capping and subsidies, has been practiced for 
a long time and is still prevalent in many countries (IEA, 2015). Many policy 
makers prefer to maintain price regulations on the grounds that these measures 
can insulate the domestic economy from the negative impacts of high oil 
prices in the world market. For example, Brunei, and in the past, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, fixed their petroleum prices at a very low level (Wu et al., 2012). 
Examining the impact of price distortion will have significant implications 
for policy makers. The consequences of price distortion due to energy price 
regulation may be beyond policy makers’ expectations. Although policy 
makers hope such price regulation may help the domestic economy by 
reducing volatility, the induced distortion may actually exert negative impacts. 
If it can be demonstrated that the hypothesis that energy price distortion 
resulting from regulations to reduce international price volatility dampens a 
domestic economy, then the basis for maintaining price regulation will be 
undermined.  
Despite its policy significance, to the best of our knowledge no previous 
study demonstrates how regulatory energy price distortion affects the 
relationship between international oil price and national economic 
development. Previous literature focuses on two distinct aspects of the 
relationship.  On the one hand, debate focuses on the relationship between the 
international oil price and national economy without examining intermediate 
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price regulation. The relationship between oil price shock, or volatility, and the 
macroeconomy has been debated since the early 1980s (Hamilton, 1983) when 
the first oil crisis occurred and global recessions followed (Jones et al., 2004; 
Segal, 2007). These studies were initially spurred on by the stagnation of the 
US economy in the 1970s, as oil price shocks were thought to be the only 
promising hypothesis that explained the stagflation (Barsky and Kilian, 2004). 
The issue of oil price shock revitalized in the 2000s with the fact that, between 
2001 and 2008, the oil price rose more than 600% while in contrast, average 
quarterly core inflation in the US was only about 2% over the same period 
(Clark and Terry, 2009). More recent studies examine details of oil price shock 
on the macroeconomy relationship. For example, An et al. (2014) found that 
the relationship between higher and lower oil prices is asymmetric while 
Cunado et al. (2015) found this relationship may be different in different 
countries. Studies also extended from examining economic growth to stocks, 
household expenditure, etc. (Broadstock et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014) and 
to examining more complicated relationships (Zhang, 2008). In the Chinese 
case, the focus of this paper, previous studies (Ju et al., 2014; Ou et al., 2012; 
Tang et al., 2010; Zaouali, 2007) generally find a negative impact on economic 
growth. There is also a detailed study on how the oil price shocks affects 
consumption in China (Zhang et al., 2014).  
On the other hand, there are numerous studies examining the relationship 
between subsidies and energy consumption, or emissions, or economic growth, 
without considering how price movement affects the outcome. For example, 
IEA (1999) found that the removal of energy subsidies would reduce energy 
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consumption and CO2 emissions in eight non-OECD countries. The IMF 
(2013) concluded that distorted energy prices will distort resource allocation to 
less productive usage, causing wasteful consumption. Wasteful consumption, 
as a result of fuel subsidies, was observed in the Nigerian case (Nwachukwu 
and Chike, 2011). A Chinese case study concludes that energy price distortions 
impede the improvement of energy consumption structures (Liu and Li, 2011). 
He et al. (2014) proved that competitive, electricity market prices could 
achieve energy savings and simultaneously, have a positive impact on social 
welfare. Studies on the macroeconomic impact of energy subsidies often use 
CGE models and demonstrate that subsidies have a negative impact on 
economic growth, employment, and social welfare (Bhattacharya and Kojima, 
2010; Wu et al., 2012).  
To fill this gap, this paper intends to revisit the impact of oil prices on 
economic development giving consideration to domestic price distortion due 
to regulation, both theoretically, through a two-sector growth model, and 
empirically, using a time-series analysis of China’s situation 1 . This paper 
focuses on China, a large, developing economy. On the one hand, China’s fast 
economic growth creates a huge demand for resources such as oil, while on 
the other hand it also maintains a number of intervention measures, such as 
price control and manipulated fuel tax, in the domestic liquid fuel (hereafter 
fuel) market. Since 2009, imported oil has accounted for more than half of 
total oil consumption in China, and at the same time the oil price has become 
                                                 
1 Note that oil price regulations have different effects on the economy, depending on 
whether the country is an oil importing or exporting economy and whether price regulations 
are imposed on oil consumption or production. In this paper, we focus on the oil importing 
country (China) and the price regulations are imposed on oil consumption. 
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more volatile. Investigating the impact of price distortion, which occurs due to 
intervention measures, will lead to significant implications for policy makers, 
not only in China, but also in other developing economies that regulate the 
energy price. Later, our empirical exercise will reveal that such distortion can 
do harm to the industrial output. Another feature of this study will combine the 
theoretical modelling with empirical analysis, where the theoretical modelling 
provides guidance for the empirical exercise, and the empirical exercise is 
implemented using a widely used technique, the Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag Model (ARDL). 
The contribution of this paper is three fold. First, we innovatively 
introduce the role of fuel price distortion into the well-examined, oil price 
shock, macroeconomy nexus. We argue that market distortion will have a 
significant negative impact on the relationship.  Second, we illustrate the 
impact of price distortion in a two-sector growth model. Our two-sector model 
is consistent with a recent study that calls for structural models, including the 
oil market, to be used to disentangle cause and effect in the relationship 
between oil prices and the economy (Kilian, 2014). Third, we propose a novel 
measurement of the price distortion. The price distortion is measured as 
relative differences between average gasoline prices in China and the New 
York Harbor, conventional gasoline, regular spot price. In contract, previous 
studies, such as Lin & Jiang (2011), use the US gasoline retailing price as a 
reference, which suffers from tax distortions. Fourth, our empirical exercise 
focuses on China, a large, fast growing, developing economy with high 
dependence on imported oil and price distortion, which leads to significant 
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implications for policy makers both in China, and other developing countries.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Following the introduction, in 
Section 2 we present a discussion of oil consumption and the energy pricing 
mechanism in China, providing background information for the subsequent 
exercise, and we explain the method of measuring price distortion in China. 
Section 3 presents a two-sector growth model, where we illustrate that oil 
price distortion indeed affects the domestic economy. Using implications from 
the theoretical model in Section 3, we then empirically test the impact of price 
distortion in China in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with policy 
implications.  
2. Fuel pricing mechanism and price distortion in China 
Due to its escalating volume of oil consumption, increasing dependence on 
oil imports, and gradually liberalizing, domestic, oil pricing mechanism, 
researchers have expected a more active interaction between the world oil 
price and China’s macro-economy (Du et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2013). 
Therefore, not surprisingly, China is a good case to study the role of market 
distortion and oil price shocks. In this section, we will discuss the pricing 
mechanisms in the energy market, and measure the associated price distortion.  
2.1 The oil consumption and pricing mechanisms 
China’s energy consumption, as well as its dependence on imported oil, 
has been increasing dramatically in the past two decades and is expected to 
continuously grow into the future (IEA, 2015). From 1990 to 2013, China’s 
GDP grew at an annual rate of 9.9% on average, and is expected to grow at an 
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annual average rate of 4.8% during the period 2013 to 2040 (IEA, 2015). Such 
fast economic growth leads to strong demand for energy. In 2009, China 
became the world’s largest energy consumer. 
Meanwhile, China has successfully adopted a gradual approach to 
removing subsidies (Lin and Jiang, 2011). Before 1998, energy prices were 
heavily regulated, and often under-priced, due to the notion that energy is 
critical to economic growth and social development (Ouyang and Sun, 2015). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China adopted a dual-track pricing system, under 
which prices for most oil products were tightly regulated, while the rest were 
traded in the market, more or less freely. A market-based petroleum pricing 
mechanism was adopted in 1998 and in October 2001, oil product prices were 
linked to major international futures markets (Du et al., 2010). They were first 
benchmarked against the Singapore futures market, and later, in 2001, the 
benchmark was extended to Singapore, Rotterdam and New York futures 
markets, where an unpublished weight was used in setting domestic prices (Du 
et al., 2010). In 2006, this price benchmark was changed from refinery product 
prices to the Brent, Dubai, and Minas crude oil prices. This price 
benchmarking, while it enables domestic markets to follow international 
markets, is also intended to insulate domestic markets from the volatility of 
petroleum prices in the global markets (IEA, 2010). Due to this intention, even 
with those liberalizing reforms implemented in early 2000, the pricing regime 
was plagued by ad hoc subsidies and non-transparent, inconsistently enforced, 
pricing behaviours.  
In 2009, China introduced a formula based, pricing mechanism for oil 
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products. According to this formula, domestic fuel prices may be adjusted 
when international, crude oil prices, measured as a weighted average of the 
Brent, Dubai and Cinta crude oil prices, change by more than 4% over a period 
of 22 working days (Government of China, 2008).  
This pricing mechanism tends to smooth the price volatility in the fuel 
markets. When the average crude oil price is below US$80 a barrel, domestic 
gasoline prices move relatively freely; between US$80 and US$130 a barrel, 
domestic prices are responsive, but cannot increase as much as the crude oil 
price does; and above US$130, fuel tax breaks will be used to keep domestic 
prices low. Furthermore, fuel price adjustments have lagged behind the world 
price movement (Kojima, 2012). Distributors and consumers take advantage 
of this lag in fuel price adjustments by hoarding oil products when 
international oil prices register large rises and selling them after the price 
adjustments (China.org.cn, 2013). 
With the mounting demand for full marketization of prices of domestic oil 
products, China again changed its oil pricing mechanism in March 2013. It 
may adjust domestic oil prices every 10 working days regardless of how much 
international oil prices change, unless price changes in international oil 
markets are not more than 50 yuan per ton. The government retains the power 
to suspend, postpone or downsize the price adjustment in special cases, such 
as sharp rises in domestic inflation, emergencies or dramatic swings in global 
oil prices. However, there are no pre-defined conditions under which the 
government will intervene and thus the government may surprise the market. 
For example, in the short period between 28 November, 2014 and 12 January, 
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2015, the Chinese government raised the fuel tax three times to take advantage 
of the declining international oil price (Huang, 2015). The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) claims that the new 
mechanism is more responsive to global oil market changes, and will help the 
country better utilize overseas resources to ensure domestic oil supplies 
(China.org.cn, 2013). 
2.2 Measurement of fuel price distortions 
Even though China is gradually liberalizing the pricing mechanism of 
domestic oil products, as discussed above, there still exists significant price 
control in the energy market. Such price control creates distortions in the 
energy market. We measure the price distortion in the following way:  
First, we calculate the average monthly gasoline price (Chinese yuan per 
ton) in China over three types of gasoline without lead (namely gasoline no. 
90, 93, and 97), where the prices for these three types of gasoline are sourced 
from the CEIC database. Second, we extract the New York Harbor, 
conventional gasoline, regular spot price, which is sourced from the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) and is free from tax distortion. The 
unit of this price is US dollars per gallon, which we then convert into US 
dollars per ton using the formula 1 gallon of gasoline = 2.7974 kg. This price 
is further converted into Chinese currency (yuan) using the period average of 
official, nominal exchange rates sourced from the IMF.  
Third, after converting the China and US gasoline prices to the same unit 
(Chinese yuan per ton), we construct measures of domestic, oil price 
distortion. Starting from a ratio of China price against US price, namely σ = 
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PChina / PUS, the main measure of price distortion is 𝜎𝜎� = |𝜎𝜎 − 1|, where P 
denotes price and 𝜎𝜎�  represents price distortion. In order to allow for an 
asymmetric impact of price distortion in our exercises later, we also construct 
measures of upward and downward price distortions, as 𝜎𝜎�+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝜎𝜎 − 1, 0} 
and 𝜎𝜎�− = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{1 − 𝜎𝜎, 0} respectively. Note that measures of price distortion 
are functions of σ, which will be used in our subsequent model derivation. One 
may argue that the measures of price distortion are driven primarily by 
transportation costs. However, given the fixed geographical distance between 
China and the US, transportation costs exhibit little variation, and hence 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎� 
(𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎�+ and 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎�−) captures the change of price distortion in China, relative to the 
US. 
Figure 1 presents the constructed price distortion. We can observe that 
there exist significant price distortions in China. On average, China’s price is 
around 46.15% higher than that of the US. In addition, even though China is 
trying to liberalize its oil product pricing mechanism, the distortion does not 
appear to be reducing. In addition, there appears to be a structural break in 
2009M1. After 2009M1, the average price distortion is clearly higher than that 
of before 2009M1. Before 2009M1, China’s price is, on average, only 26.1% 
higher than that of the US, while in contrast it is, on average, 66.19% higher 
after 2009M1. One reason for the increase in the gasoline price is that fuel tax 
was increased from 0.2 CNY (US$0.3 cents) per litre to 1 CNY (US$0.15 
cents) per litre from 2009. Given the continuous, high level in the oil price, it 
is argued that even the gasoline was under-priced (Xin Jing Bao, 2011). 
<Figure 1 about here> 
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3. The model 
Price controls are the main reason for price distortion in the energy market. 
Nevertheless, they are often justified on the grounds that they shield a 
domestic economy from undesired, oil price shocks in the world market. Such 
oil price shocks can lead to inflation and recession in a domestic economy 
(Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Darby, 1982). This negative impact, however, is 
questioned in later studies (Bernanke et al., 1997).  A number of recent studies 
suggest that the negative impact does not derive from the oil price shocks 
themselves, instead, they suggest it is from policy response to the oil price 
shocks (Kilian, 2008).  
In addition, price controls, such as subsidies or taxes, themselves 
negatively affect a domestic economy. A number of studies show that energy 
price distortion hurts economic growth (Tang et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2013). 
Conceptually, regulated energy prices can affect a domestic economy in the 
following three ways: (i) subsidies, or surrendered profits from state owned oil 
companies, transfer government revenue to consumers in a way that is not 
necessarily efficient. Not surprisingly, we can expect welfare loss from such 
subsidies; (ii) the price distortion, due to either subsidy or tax, leads to 
inefficient allocation of energy among industrial users. Empirically, Linn 
(2008), shows that firms respond to energy price change; (iii) for retail 
consumers, the low (high) energy price can also lead to inefficient 
consumption of energy (GSI,2011). For example, faced with cheaper fuel 
prices, consumers are more likely to use vehicles more intensively, and have 
less incentive to switch to higher energy efficient vehicles.  
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Therefore, we expect price distortion to affect the domestic economy. Next 
we explore the impacts of fuel price distortion, measured as the price deviation 
between domestic and world markets, on the domestic economy in a two-
sector growth model. In the model, we show that price distortion affects steady 
state output in an asymmetric manner. 
3.1 A two sector growth model 
With an endowment of labour L, the economy consists of two sectors, 
namely the oil sector and the final goods sector. A representative consumer 
chooses a sequence of consumption of final goods to maximize their life time 
utility, as follows: 
max
{𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡}




where t denotes time, ρ is the discount rate and c denotes quantity of 
consumption. At each period, the consumer is faced with the following budget 
constraint: 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 
where k denotes capital they own, w is their wage income, and r and δ are 
rental and depreciation rates of capital respectively. Solving the utility 
maximization problem, we obtain an Euler equation as follows: 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
= 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 + 1 − 𝛿𝛿        (1) 
In the final goods sector, capital, labour, and oil are used to produce final 
goods in a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas function: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽       (2) 
where Y, A, L, Ky, and 𝑂𝑂 denote the output, technology, labour, capital used in 
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the final goods sector, and oil inputs respectively, and α and β are two 
parameters where 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , 𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1) , 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1) . The oil inputs are 
sourced from either domestic or world markets. Let pt denote the oil price in 
the world market and σtpt denote domestic oil price. If there is no distortion in 
the market, we shall observe σt to be one, due to the law of one price. Hence σt 
contains information on the distortion in the domestic oil market, assuming 
that the world market is distortion free. As discussed in the previous section, 
from σt, one can construct a simple index to measure the distortion in domestic 
market as 𝜎𝜎�𝑡𝑡, where the higher value of the index implies a higher level of 
distortion. Note that 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎�𝑡𝑡
= � 1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙−1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 . Besides, as our 
aim is to examine the impact of such distortion on domestic economy, we take 
σt as exogenous, rather than explicitly modelling the formation of σt.  
Firms in the final goods sector choose employment of labour, capital, and 
oil to maximize their profits: 
max
�𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡�
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡)𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
where 1-γ denotes oil dependence, namely the share of oil consumption that is 
sourced from the world market. Profit maximization yields the following first 
order conditions: 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽      (3) 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼−1𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽       (4) 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽−1 − (𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 + 1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 0    (5) 
Equation (5) defines the demand for oil, from which we can derive the 
corresponding demand for domestic oil as: 
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      (6) 
In the oil sector, firms are engaged in two activities; oil extraction and 
discovering new oil reserves. The oil extraction is a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, as follows: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
𝜂𝜂         (7) 
where X, S, and Kx1 denote the oil output, oil reserve, and capital used in the 
oil sector (𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,1]), and η is the parameter that takes a value between 
zero and one to capture a diminishing return of capital investment in oil 
extraction. To discover a new oil reserve, firms need to invest capital, which is 
also subject to a diminishing return and takes a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = B𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃         (8) 
where Dt denotes the discovery of new oil in each period; Kx2t is the capital 
stock committed to discovering a new oil reserve; B denotes the productivity 
in discovering a new oil reserve; and 𝜃𝜃 ∈ (0,1). The economy is initially 
endowed with an oil reserve of S0, and subsequently the oil reserve evolves in 
the following manner: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝜂𝜂 � + Dt = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝜂𝜂 � + B𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃    (9) 
Subject to the transition of state variable S (Equation 9), firms in the oil 
sector choose the level of capital to maximize their life time profits, with the 
Bellman equation as follows: 
𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = max{𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡}





𝛽𝛽𝜂𝜂 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1)� 
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. The second 
equation is obtained by plugging in the demand for domestic oil (Equation 6) 
and oil production function (Equation 7) into the first equation.  
By differentiating the value function with respect to Kx1t and Kx2t, we 
obtain the first order conditions as follows: 
𝛽𝛽𝜂𝜂𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡
















𝜃𝜃−1.      (10) 

















𝛽𝛽−1  ) and plugged into the above first order 
condition to obtain the following equations: 
𝛽𝛽𝜂𝜂𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡







𝛽𝛽−1 �         (11) 





𝛽𝛽−1 �  (12) 
They characterize the optimal level of capital in the oil sector. Equation (11) 
indicates that the optimal level of capital invested in oil extraction shall be 
such that its marginal revenue (the right hand side of Equation 11) is equal to 
16 
 
marginal cost (the left hand side of Equation 11). Note that since current oil 
extraction affects future oil extraction through the reduction of oil reserves, the 
marginal cost is the rental rate plus a term that accounts for the cost of 
reduction in oil reserves. Similarly, Equation 12 suggests that the capital shall 
be allocated to oil discovery such that its marginal cost (the rental rate) is 
equal to its marginal benefit (the right hand side of Equation 12).  
The resource constraint in the economy (goods market clears) implies that: 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡+1 −
(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡)𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡      
 (13) 
where Ct = Lct and Kx1t + Kx2t + Kyt = Lkt. A competitive equilibrium in the 
economy is then characterized by �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡=0
∞
 such that 
Equations (1), (3), (4), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) are satisfied.  
3.2 Impact of price distortion (σ) at steady state 
We now focus on a steady state where consumption, output, capital stocks 
in the final goods sector, oil extraction and oil discovery, oil self-sufficiency, 
and domestic oil price distortion are constant, namely Ct = C, Yt = Y, Kyt = Ky, 
Kx1t = Kx1, Kx2 = Kx2, γt = γ, and σt = σ. Since Ct = C, from Equation (1), the 
equilibrium interest rate in the steady state is constant, as follows: 
𝑟𝑟 = 1
𝜌𝜌
+ 𝛿𝛿 − 1                (14) 
From Equations (2) and (4), we can obtain: 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝛼𝛼−1𝑂𝑂𝛽𝛽           (15) 
From Equation (9), we can solve for the steady state oil reserve as a function 
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𝛽𝛽         (16) 






      (17) 
𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽𝜂𝜂𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥1






𝛽𝛽−1 𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥2𝜃𝜃−1      (19) 
Therefore, Equations (16), (17), and (19) are three equations with three 
unknowns (capital stocks in oil extraction and oil discovery, and steady 
state oil reserves). Solving these equations, we can obtain the following 
















       (20) 
where the steady state is obtained by using the fact that 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 = 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑆𝑆 in the 
steady state. Equation (20) suggests that the price ratio (σ) does not affect 
the oil sector (oil extraction and discovery) in the steady state.  
By plugging Equation (20) into Equations (15) and (18), we can obtain the 




𝛾𝛾(𝜎𝜎 − 1) + 1
= 𝜏𝜏
 
where 𝜆𝜆 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃
𝛽𝛽𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝑟𝑟(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃









       (21) 






𝜎𝜎 = 0     (22) 
Equation (22) implicitly defines oil self-sufficiency (or equivalently oil 
import dependency, 1-γ) as a non-linear function of the price ratio (σ). By 
totally differentiating Equation (22), we can obtain the first order derivative of 






      (23) 
We can also approximate Equation (22) using the first order Taylor expansion 
at γ = 1, and solve the subsequent linear equation to obtain an approximate 
steady state value of oil self-sufficiency as follows: 




      (24) 
To solve Equation (23), we first let 𝑔𝑔(𝛾𝛾) = (𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 −
1, 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1]. Note that since 0< α < 1, 0< α+β < 1, and σ > 0, g(γ) is a 
monotonically increasing function of γ, 𝑔𝑔(0) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1 < 0  and 𝑔𝑔(1) =
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎 > 0. Therefore, if 𝛾𝛾 < 1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎+1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, g(γ) < 0, then subsequently 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎⁄ > 0. 
If 𝛾𝛾 = 1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎+1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, g(γ) = 0, then subsequently 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎⁄  is not defined. If 
𝛾𝛾 > 1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎+1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, g(γ) > 0, then subsequently 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾 𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎⁄ < 0. Therefore the sign of 
impact of price distortion (𝜎𝜎�) on oil self-sufficiency (or equivalently oil import 




Proposition 1: When the steady state economy is at a low self-sufficiency 
rate (high oil import dependency rate), 𝛾𝛾 < 1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎+1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
) with upward price 
distortion or at a high self-sufficiency rate (low oil import dependency rate), 
𝛾𝛾 > 1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎+1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
) with downward price distortion, an increase in oil price 
distortion (𝜎𝜎�) leads to an increase in the oil self-sufficiency rate (reduction in 
oil import dependency). In contrast, at a low, self-sufficiency rate with 
downward price distortion, or at a high, self-sufficiency rate with upward price 
distortion, an increase in the distortion results in decreasing self-sufficiency 
(increase in oil import dependency).  
From Equations (2), (20), and (21), we can resolve the steady state output, 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁 [𝛾𝛾(𝜎𝜎−1)+1]
2
𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎2
       (25) 
where 𝑁𝑁 ≡ 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃
𝛽𝛽𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃
(1−𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃
; γ = γ(σ); 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1]; σ > 0. Differentiate 
Equation (25) with respect to σ, we obtain the following equation: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎




Note in Equation (26), the sign dY/dσ depends on the two terms, (2 − 𝛼𝛼 −
𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎 − 1)𝛾𝛾 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽  and (𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1 . Let 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) =
(2 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎 − 1)𝛾𝛾 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽  and 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) = (𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 −
1 . Observe that 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎)  is a monotonically increasing function of γ, with  
𝑔𝑔�(0, 𝜎𝜎(0)) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1 < 0  and 𝑔𝑔�(1, 𝜎𝜎(1)) = 𝛽𝛽𝜎𝜎(1) = 0  where 𝜎𝜎(0)  and 
𝜎𝜎(1) denote the associated σ when γ is equal to 0 and 1 respectively and from 
Equation (24) 𝜎𝜎(1) = 0. Therefore 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) ≤ 0.  
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As for the sign 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎), if 0 < 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 1, 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) ≤ 0. If 𝜎𝜎 > 1, 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) is a 
monotonically increasing function of γ, and −𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) ≤
(2 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 . Thus if 1 < 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) ≤ 0 . If 
𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, (2 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎 − 1) − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 > 0 , and hence 𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎)  can be 
either negative or positive. Given that 𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
, we can further find that: 
�
𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) ≤ 0, if 𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽(2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎−1)
𝑔𝑔�(𝛾𝛾, 𝜎𝜎) > 0, if 𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾 > 𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽(2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎−1)
. 
Summarizing the above discussion, we can characterize the conditions 
under which the fuel price distortion affects the steady state output, as follows: 
Proposition 2: With downward price distortion ( 0 < 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 1 ), price 
distortion affects the steady state output (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎�
> 0); With low upward price 
distortion (1 < 𝜎𝜎 ≤ 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
) or high price distortion (𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
) and the oil 
self-sufficiency rate not too high ( 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽(2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎−1) ), price distortion 
negatively affects the steady state output (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎�
< 0); With high upward price 
distortion ( 𝜎𝜎 > 2
2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
) and a high oil self-sufficiency rate (namely 𝛾𝛾 >
𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽
(2−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝜎𝜎−1)
), the impact of the distortion is unclear. 
4. Empirical estimations 
In Section 3, we investigate the impact of oil price distortion in a two-
sector growth model, where we show that fuel price distortion affects the 
domestic economy (Proposition 2). We now turn to an empirical exercise, 




4.1 Empirical specification 
Equations (9), (11) and (12) define the optimal level of capital stock in the 
oil extraction as a function of its one period lag, labour, capital stock in the 
final goods sector, real interest rate, oil reserve, and oil dependency, as 
follows: 
𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖�𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1� (27) 
where 𝑖𝑖(∙) denotes the associated functional form derived from Equations (9), 
(10) and (11).  By plugging Equation (27) into Equation (7) and using the fact 
that domestic production of oil is equal to domestic demand minus oil imports, 




𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1�
𝜂𝜂
          (28) 
By plugging Equation (4) into Equation (28) we then find the demand for oil 
(Ot) as: 
𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖�𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1� (29) 
where 𝑖𝑖(∙) denotes the associated functional form. From Equations (29) and 
(6), we can eliminate γt to obtain the oil demand as follows: 
𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖�𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1�  (30) 
Equation (30) can then be plugged into Equation (2) to obtain the following 
equation: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 𝑖𝑖�𝐾𝐾𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡−1, 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−1�
𝛽𝛽
         (31) 
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We then use the following logarithm linear specification to operationalize 
Equation (31): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) = 𝜙𝜙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑑𝑑 + 𝜽𝜽′𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡   (32) 
where λ0, λ1, ϕ, and θ are short-run parameters, with the long-run parameters 
being λ0/(1 – ϕ), λ1/(1 – ϕ), and θ/(1 – ϕ), and Zt = (Lt Kyt 1-γt-1 σt pt σt×pt)’, and 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  is an i.i.d. error term. We use 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 to capture the impact of lagged variables, 
such as Lt-1, in Equation (31), and λ0 + λ1t + ut to capture the rest factors, such 
as St and A.  In vector Zt we also interact the distortion with oil import price to 
capture the possible interaction effect between them. Note that Equation (32) 
is an autoregressive, distributed lag model (ARDL(1,0)), and we can 
generalize it by allowing for lags in Zt and longer lags in Yt, as follows: 
𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑑𝑑 + 𝜽𝜽′(𝐿𝐿)𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡    (32b) 
where 𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿) = 1 − ∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 , and 𝜽𝜽(𝐿𝐿) = ∑ 𝜽𝜽𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 , and m and n denote lag 
length. Since our data are time series, it is not surprising that Zs can be 
nonstationary. Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the ordinary, least square 
estimator of the short-run parameters and the corresponding long-run 
parameter estimates are consistent even if the regressors (Zt) are I(1).  
It can also be argued that Zt can be endogenous, namely 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡) ≠ 0. For 
example, on the one hand the oil imports positively contribute to domestic 
economic growth, while on the other hand, as the economy grows, it may 
become more and more dependent on oil imports, namely a higher level of Y 
leads to a higher level of 1-γ. This possible endogeneity can be controlled by 
including a number of leads and lags of regressors in differences, which 
absorbs the correlation between regressors and the error term (Stock and 
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Watson, 1993). Therefore, we augment Equation (32b) by including the leads 
and lags of differenced Z and re-write the right hand side variables, as follows: 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑑𝑑 + 𝜙𝜙∗(𝐿𝐿)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) + 𝜽𝜽′𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡 + ∑ ∆𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗
𝑞𝑞
𝑗𝑗=−𝑞𝑞 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡   (33) 
where 𝜙𝜙∗(𝐿𝐿) = ∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝
𝑗𝑗=1 − 𝐿𝐿, Δ denotes the difference operator (namely Δ = 
1 – L), and q denotes the length of lags. Note that the summation in Equation 
(33) is made from –q to q, and thus leads of differenced Z are included as well. 
4.2 Variable construction and data 
The dataset is a monthly time series from 2005M1 to 2012M12 in China2. 
Data was obtained from the CEIC database, which collects data from different 
sources. We used two series to measure the output (y)3. The first one is the 
industrial production index, which is calculated from a series (percentage 
change of industrial production index over the corresponding month of the 
previous year) sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), assuming 
year 1993 is 100. The other is industrial sales in billion Chinese yuan sourced 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). We used the producer price 
index for industrial products, sourced from NBS with a base year of 1997, to 
deflate the industrial sales. Labour (L) is also sourced from NBS, and is 
measured as the number of employees in industrial enterprises with the unit 
being a thousand persons. The labour series has missing values replaced by an 
interpolation. 
The capital (Ky, in billion yuan) is constructed from fixed asset investment. 
First, we calculated the monthly increment of fixed asset investment in 
                                                 
2 This sample period is selected based on data availability. 
3 Due to data unavailability, we do not use GDP as a dependent variable. 
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secondary industry from year-to-date fixed asset investment data, and deflated 
it using the fixed asset price index with a base year of 2003. Second, we 
assumed a monthly capital depreciation rate of 0.4%, which translates to a 
4.9% per annum depreciate rate, and take 2005M1 fixed asset investment as 
the initial capital stock. The capital stock in subsequent periods is then 
calculated as: Kyt = It + (1– 0.004) × Kyt-1, where It denotes newly increased 
fixed asset investment in period t and Ky0 = I0.  
The oil dependency (1– γ) is measured as the share of oil imports in 
domestic oil consumption, and is constructed as follows. First, we extracted 
the imports and exports of crude oil (in million US dollars) and the import and 
export prices (in US dollars per ton), sourced from General Administration of 
Customs from the CEIC database. From the value and price of imports and 
exports, we then calculate the quantity of exports and imports. Second, we 
extracted the domestic production of crude oil, sourced from NBS. The oil 
dependency ratio is then calculated as: 1– γ = Qimports / (Qimports + Qproduction – 
Qexports), where Q denotes quantity.  
The crude oil import price (US dollar per ton) is sourced from General 
Administration of Customs. We converted the US dollar denoted price into 
Chinese yuan by using the period average of the official nominal exchange 
rate sourced from the IMF, and then deflated the import price by the producer 
price index for industrial products. The measures of oil price distortion are 
constructed as discussed in Section 2. 
Since the data are monthly time series, it is not surprising that they exhibit 
seasonality. We thus adjusted the data series by using the X-12-ARIMA 
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Seasonal Adjustment Program to eliminate the influence of seasonal 
fluctuation4. The X-12-ARIMA is a standard approach used by the US Census 
Bureau for seasonal adjustment of time series data.  
4.3 Unit root tests 
We first carried out unit root tests to check the stationarity of the time 
series. Table 1 reports the results, where both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and Phillips–Perron (PP) unit 
root test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) are used. Not surprisingly, it can be 
observed that some variables are I(1), while others are I(0). The capital stock 
and oil dependency ratio are both I(0), where the null hypothesis of unit root is 
rejected at the 5% level.  
For the measure of domestic oil price distortion, since Figure 1 suggests 
that there exists a structural break, we carried out the Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) unit root test that allows for a structural break5.  Although results in 
Table 1 indicate that the measure is I(1), the Zivot and Andrews test suggests 
I(0), with the test statistic being -5.57, significant at the 5% level. 
The industrial production index is I(1) in that the test statistic for level 
variable is insignificant while the test statistic for first differenced variables is 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly the labour series is I(1). Industrial sales 
are also considered to be I(1) at the 1% level, since the test statistics for the PP 
and ADF with time trend for level variable are only significant at the 5 and 
                                                 
4 Details of the X-12-ARIMA can be found at http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/. 
5 We utilized a program in Stata 13, written by Christopher F. Baum from Boston College, 
to implement this test. More details of the test can be found in Salim and Bloch Salim R, 
Bloch H, 2009. Expenditures on Business R&D and Trade Performance in Australia: Is there a 
Link? Applied Economics. 41, 351-361. 
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10 % levels respectively, and the test statistics for first differenced variable are 
significant at the 1% level. Given that variables are a mixture of I(1) and I(0), 
ARDL modelling is an appropriate approach as it can be applied when 
variables are of a different order of integration, considered the main advantage 
of ARDL modelling (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997).  
<Table 1 about here> 
4.4 Regression results 
To estimate Equation (33), we have two measures of industrial output 
(industrial sales and industrial production index) and two measures of 
domestic fuel price distortions6. In the following, we describe the empirical 
exercise using industrial sales as the measure of industrial output and the 
absolute percentage deviation of the China gasoline price from the US 
gasoline price (𝜎𝜎�) as a measure of oil price distortions, and the rest regressions 
will follow the same specification. The first step in the exercise is to determine 
the length of lags. We used the Schwartz’s Bayesian Information Criteria 
(BIC) to determine lag length, and chose the length of lags that yield a 
minimal BIC. The BIC suggests an optimal lag length of one for both the 
dependent and explanatory variables in Equation (33).   
Table 2 reports the regression results, where the left panel is the estimated 
results of short-run coefficients, as in Equation (33), and the right panel is the 
associated long-run coefficients. After the regression, we also carried out a set 
of diagnostic tests. The Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation found no 
evidence of first, second, third, fourth, or fifth order autocorrelation at the 1% 
                                                 




significance level. An LM test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) also failed to reject the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH effects at the 1% level. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity obtained a test statistic of 47.72 with a p-value of 0.006, 
suggesting existence of heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we report the robust 
standard errors in the regressions. We also examined the stationarity of the 
residual by conducting both ADF and PP tests, which both reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root at the 1% level. Figure 2 presents the plots of the 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the squared CUSUM 
(CUSUMSQ) tests for parameter stability. It suggests an absence of coefficient 
instability as both statistics fall approximately inside the 5% confidence 
interval in the plots. Therefore the regression is appropriate.  
<Table 2 about here> 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
The long-run (steady state) coefficients in Table 2 are computed as short-
run coefficients divided by the negative of the coefficient of lnyt-1, and the 
associated standard errors are computed using the delta method. For example, 
let φ and θl (one element of θ in Equation 33) denote the long-run and short-
run coefficients of labour (lnlt) respectively, and ϕy denote the coefficient of 
lagged industrial output (lnyt-1). Then φ = – θl / ϕy. To obtain the associated 
standard error, we first linearize φ by the first order Taylor approximation at 
the point estimates of θl and ϕy, namely 𝜑𝜑 ≅ − 𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦� − �𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 −  𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙� 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦� +
𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙�𝜙𝜙𝑦𝑦 −  𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦� 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦2� , where the hat denotes point estimate. Then 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟(𝜑𝜑)� =
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𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟(𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙)� 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦2� + 𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙2𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟�𝜙𝜙𝑦𝑦�� 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦4� − 2𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣�𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 , 𝜙𝜙𝑦𝑦� 𝜙𝜙�𝑦𝑦3� , and 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = �𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟(𝜑𝜑)� , 
where var, cov and se denote variance, covariance and standard error 
respectively. 
In Table 2, the significantly negative coefficient of lagged industrial sales 
suggests that industrial sales growth rate decreases as it grows bigger7. This 
regressive development is consistent with the finding of Sheng and Shi (2013) 
that economic growth across countries converges unconditionally. Not 
surprisingly, labour and capital positively contribute to industrial growth, and 
the coefficient of time is positive and significant at the 10% level, confirming 
the role of technological progress. Oil dependency (1– γt) appears not to 
significantly affect industrial growth in the short run.  
Regarding the impacts of oil import price and fuel price distortion, the 
estimated coefficients of both oil price distortion and oil import price are 
significantly negative, and the coefficient of their interaction term is 
significantly positive. The significant estimate suggests that both oil import 
price and price distortion play important roles in the economy. We then 
differentiate the estimated equation with respect to the oil import price and 
price distortion, respectively, to obtain their marginal impacts, as follows: 
∂E[∆lnyt]
∂lnpt
= −0.0766 + 0.2403 × σ� 
∂E[∆lnyt]
∂ln𝜎𝜎�
= −1.9335 + 0.2403 × lnpt 
Therefore, the marginal impact of oil import price depends on the level of 
                                                 
7 Note Δln(yt) is approximately growth rate of industrial output. 
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price distortion and at the same time the marginal impact of fuel price 
distortion also depends on the level of oil import price.  
In the long run (steady state), the coefficients of all the variables, except 
oil dependency, are significant and maintain the same sign as in the short run. 
Regarding the long run impacts of oil import price and price distortion, similar 
to before, we can obtain the marginal impacts as below: 
∂E[lny]
∂lnp
= −.0721 + 0.2263 × 𝜎𝜎� 
∂E[lny]
∂𝜎𝜎�
= −1.821 + 0.2263 × lnp 
4.5 Robustness 
The previous exercise found that oil price distortion exerts a significant 
impact on industrial production over both the short and the long term. 
However, is this finding robust enough to use as an alternative measure of 
industrial production? In this section, we explore this using an industrial 
production index as a measure of output.  
Due to the way the original data are reported, namely, the original series is 
the percentage change in the industrial production index over the 
corresponding month of the previous year, we have to assume that in each 
month of 1993 the production index is 100 in order to calculate the index from 
2005M1 to 2012M12. Owing to this assumption, results in Table 3 serve only 
as a comparison to those in Table 2. Compared with Table 2, the signs of 
coefficients of distortion, oil import price and their interaction term, continue 
to hold in both the short and the long run.  
The coefficients of lagged industrial production index and capital have the 
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same sign as those of Table 2, while their magnitude is different. The 
coefficient of labour now becomes insignificant at the 1% level. Therefore, 
even though we observe some variations in the coefficient estimate between 
Tables 2 and 3, the impact of oil price distortion appears to be robust to 
different measures of industrial production. 
<Table 3 about here> 
As discussed in Section 2, we also constructed measures of upward and 
downward distortions, in order to accommodate for the possibility that the 
impact is asymmetric. We re-estimated Equation (33) using the upward 
distortion, where the length of lag is one. Table 4 reports the results. 
Comparing the estimated coefficients of oil import price, price distortion and 
their interaction term with those of Table 2, the regression exhibits little 
variation. The coefficients of the other variables are also approximately in line 
with those of Table 2. Hence, the findings are robust to alternative measures of 
price distortion.  
<Table 4 about here> 
Figure 1 suggests a structural break for oil price distortion exists in 
2009M1. So, in the above exercise, we also included a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one in the time after 2009M1 into the regression. The 
estimation finds that the coefficient of the dummy variable is insignificant at 
the 1% level, and there is only little variation in the coefficients of the other 




5. Concluding remarks  
This paper explores the impact of oil price distortion on domestic economy 
both theoretically in a two-sector growth model, and empirically in China. In 
the theoretical model, we show that price distortion can negatively affect the 
steady state output. Empirically, using a specification derived from the 
theoretical model, we applied the ARDL modeling technique to a monthly 
time series dataset in China from 2005M1 to 2012M12, and found that oil 
price distortion can do harm to industrial growth in the short term, and 
furthermore, this negative impact persists into the long term. The impact of oil 
price distortion appears to be robust to different measures of industrial 
production.  
This finding, that price distortion, which occurs mainly due to price 
regulation, can harm economic growth, contradicts a common argument for 
energy price regulation, namely that price regulation can shield the domestic 
economy from negative oil price shocks in the world market.  
This study lends its support to energy price deregulation, namely that it is 
justifiable to remove policies and interventions, such as subsidies, which may 
distort domestic energy prices, on the grounds that they hurt the domestic 
economy. A market oriented, energy price regime may improve the resilience 
of the domestic economy to global, oil price shocks. Although removal of 
subsidies is sensitive and difficult, a gradual approach is still possible, as 
China has demonstrated in the past.  
However, even in China, the removal of regulations from prices is 
challenging, as it needs coordination and cooperation within the government 
32 
 
and support of the public and other key stakeholders. What should be done 
immediately is to build consensus about removal of energy price regulation 
among various stakeholders. Also, the government could move forward a little 
bit by reducing the frequency of price adjustments, replacing regulatory prices 
with benchmark prices, and allowing increased variation from benchmark 
prices.  




Table 1 Unit Root Tests 
  Levels First Difference  
 
ADF PP ADF PP 







Industrial sales (lnY) -0.98 -3.72 -1.16 -3.38 -17.15 -17.24 -18.15 -18.63 I(1) 
Industrial production index (lnY) -1.41 -2.14 -1.62 -1.95 -9.37 -9.49 -9.44 -9.62 I(1) 
Labour (lnL) -1.18 -3.05 -1.12 -2.72 -13.33 -13.3 -14.04 -14.04 I(1) 
Capital (lnK) -19.71 -12.91 -12.59 -12.7 -1.91 -4 -1.48 -4.07 I(0) 
Oil dependency (1-γ) -2.88 -10.03 -2.22 -10.07 -20.75 -20.65 -24.99 -25 I(0) 
Oil import price (lnp) -1.77 -1.82 -2.41 -2.53 -5.66 -5.63 -5.67 -5.64 I(1) 
Fuel price distortion (𝜎𝜎�) -2.6 -2.81 -2.49 -2.75 -9.09 -9.05 -9.15 -9.1 I(1) 






Table 2 Regression Results with Industrial Sales 
  Short-run coefficients Long-run coefficients 
  Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t 
lnyt-1 -1.0618 (0.1950) -5.45    
lnl 0.6382 (0.1934) 3.3 0.6010 (0.1454) 4.13 
lnk 0.3327 (0.0942) 3.53 0.3133 (0.0785) 3.99 
1 – γ -0.1041 (0.4121) -0.25 -0.0980 (0.3961) -0.25 
t 0.0037 (0.0019) 1.95 0.0035 (0.0016) 2.2 
𝜎𝜎� -1.9335 (0.5606) -3.45 -1.8210 (0.5483) -3.32 
lnp -0.0766 (0.0351) -2.18 -0.0721 (0.0312) -2.31 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 × 𝜎𝜎� 0.2403 (0.0714) 3.37 0.2263 (0.0706) 3.2 
constant -1.2494 (1.5275) -0.82    
Number of obs 92      
F 2.76      
Adjusted R2 0.6      
Note: the dependent variable is Δln(yt); the estimated coefficients of ΔZt are not 







Table 3 Regression Results with Industrial Production Index 
  Short-run coefficients Long-run coefficients 
  Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t 
lnyt-1 -0.3357 (0.0975) -3.44    
lnlt 0.0772 (0.0525) 1.47 0.2299 (0.1441) 1.60 
lnkt 0.0887 (0.0408) 2.17 0.2643 (0.0961) 2.75 
1 – γt-1 -0.0934 (0.0971) -0.96 -0.2782 (0.3049) -0.91 
t 0.0011 (0.0007) 1.6 0.0034 (0.0018) 1.88 
𝜎𝜎� -0.3920 (0.1476) -2.66 -1.1678 (0.5272) -2.22 
lnpt -0.0058 (0.0091) -0.64 -0.0172 (0.0283) -0.61 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 × 𝜎𝜎� 0.0493 (0.0187) 2.63 0.1468 (0.0673) 2.18 
constant 0.5348 (0.5354) 1    
Number of obs 92      
F 5.83      
Adjusted R2 0.68      
Note: the dependent variable is Δln(yt); the estimated coefficients of ΔZt are not 






Table 4 Regression Results with Alternative Measure of Distortion 
  Short-run coefficients Long-run coefficients 
  Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. t 
lnyt-1 -1.0478 (0.1796) -5.83    
lnlt 0.6974 (0.1734) 4.02 0.6656 (0.1393) 4.78 
lnkt 0.2901 (0.0878) 3.3 0.2769 (0.0748) 3.70 
1 – γt-1 -0.1133 (0.2657) -0.43 -0.1082 (0.2633) -0.41 
t 0.0042 (0.0019) 2.25 0.0040 (0.0016) 2.55 
𝜎𝜎� -1.9575 (0.4267) -4.59 -1.8682 (0.4286) -4.36 
lnpt -0.0705 (0.0392) -1.8 -0.0673 (0.0372) -1.81 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢 × 𝜎𝜎� 0.2423 (0.0539) 4.49 0.2312 (0.0548) 4.22 
constant -1.6680 (1.5175) -1.1    
Number of obs 92      
F 4.18      
Adjusted R2 0.63      
Note: the dependent variable is Δln(yt), where y is industrial sales; the upward 
price distortion is defined as 𝜎𝜎�+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 / 𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 − 1, 0}; the estimated 





Figure 1 The Price Distortion in China 
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